Straight answers to the things people actually ask.

OpenDescent is a free, open-source, decentralized peer-to-peer messaging and community app. It offers end-to-end encrypted text messages, voice and video calls, file sharing, community hubs with channels and roles, anonymous onion-routed posts (Dead Drops), and a Dead Man's Switch, all without central servers, phone numbers, emails, or accounts.

Yes. OpenDescent is free and open source under the MIT license. Every core feature (messaging, calls, hubs, encryption, file sharing) is free forever. An optional Pro subscription (£5/month) unlocks larger file transfers and more hubs and helps fund the project, but is not required for core functionality.

No. OpenDescent requires no phone number, no email, and no account. Your identity is an Ed25519 cryptographic keypair generated on your device the first time you open the app. You back it up with a 12-word BIP39 mnemonic phrase, and that's it.

Download the Windows installer from the download page or directly from GitHub Releases. Run the .exe, pick an install location, and you're done. No sign-up, no email confirmation: the app generates your identity on first launch.

• Windows 10+: fully supported today (v0.5.7)
• macOS: build in progress, coming soon
• Linux: AppImage available today (v0.5.9)
• iOS / Android: a Progressive Web App (PWA) is on the roadmap; native apps are longer-term

If mobile-first is a hard requirement for you today, Signal is probably a better fit while we work on it.

Not yet. A Progressive Web App is on the roadmap, which will work on both iOS and Android via the browser. Native apps are further out. For now, OpenDescent is a desktop-first experience.

Honestly: not many. We launched publicly in 2026 and are still in the early-adopter phase. Because OpenDescent has no analytics and no central server, we don't actually know how many people run the app, which is by design. If you care about reaching a big existing user base today, Signal or WhatsApp are better. If you care about being early on something that is a different architecture, welcome.

OpenDescent is the rebrand. The project was originally called DecentraNet internally; some protocol strings still use the old name for backward compatibility with early peers. User-facing, it's OpenDescent everywhere.

Every message uses an ephemeral X25519 key agreement with the recipient's long-term key, derives a symmetric key via HKDF-SHA256, encrypts with AES-256-GCM (authenticated encryption), and signs a hash of the ciphertext with Ed25519. Messages travel through libp2p Noise-encrypted transport channels. See the security page for the full walkthrough.

No. And technically, there is no 'OpenDescent' in a position to. Messages are encrypted on your device before they leave, and OpenDescent has no central servers. There is no company-operated infrastructure between your device and your recipient's. Messages are readable only on the two endpoints, after decryption with the recipient's key.

OpenDescent uses standard, peer-reviewed cryptographic primitives (Ed25519, X25519, AES-256-GCM, HKDF, libp2p Noise) and the codebase is open source and auditable. No formal third-party audit has been performed yet; that's on the roadmap. For the full honest threat model including what we don't protect against, see the security page's threat model section.

For message content: yes, the cryptography is modern and strong enough to resist mass interception of content. For traffic analysis (who you're talking to, when): OpenDescent doesn't hide this by default. A sufficiently-resourced observer of internet traffic can see that you're connected to specific peers. Route OpenDescent over Tor or a trusted VPN if that matters for you. For targeted attacks on your device: no messenger in existence protects a compromised endpoint from a determined state-level adversary.

Not by a professional third-party firm (like Trail of Bits, NCC Group, or Cure53), not yet. The code is open source and uses standard primitives that are themselves extensively audited. A formal audit is on the roadmap and is partially what the Founder's Edition helps fund. We will not claim 'audited' until we are.

The app: nothing. No analytics, no telemetry, no tracking, because there's no central server to send it to. The marketing website at open-descent.com uses Plausible, a privacy-friendly analytics service that does not use cookies and does not collect personal information. No third-party tracking pixels. No advertising SDKs.

A direct peer you connect to can see your IP at connection time. This is a peer-level observation, not a global one. No single entity has the whole network graph. Your messages cannot be read by any peer (only the final recipient can decrypt them). If IP-level privacy matters, route OpenDescent over Tor or a VPN. Also consider Dead Drops, which are specifically designed for identity-free posts via onion routing.

Yes. The full codebase is open source under the MIT license at github.com/Jaguwa/OpenDescent. You can read it, build it, fork it, modify it, and contribute to it. Everything claimed on this site is verifiable against the source code.

Your local messages are encrypted at rest. If the device uses disk encryption (Windows BitLocker, macOS FileVault) and a strong password, an attacker with physical access faces substantial effort before they can read anything. If they bypass that, they can read messages on that device and send as you going forward. You should: (1) recover your identity on a new device using your 12-word mnemonic, (2) tell your close contacts your key was potentially compromised and to re-verify via TOFU if possible, and (3) consider generating a new identity and rebuilding from trusted contacts.

Yes. Voice and video calls use WebRTC with DTLS-SRTP encryption end-to-end. Connections are direct peer-to-peer when possible and fall back to TURN relays when NAT prevents direct connections. Relays see encrypted packets only; they never have decryption keys.

Yes. File transfers use signed manifests (canonical JSON signed with your Ed25519 key) plus XOR-parity sharding for resilience and SHA-256 integrity hashes for each chunk. Recipients verify the signature before assembling the file. Free tier has a file size limit; Pro unlocks larger transfers.

Yes: we call them hubs. A hub has text channels, voice channels, categories, roles and permissions, and invite links, the same shape as a Discord server. The difference is that hubs are peer-replicated across members' devices rather than hosted on a central server. See OpenDescent vs Discord for the full comparison.

Dead Drops are anonymous onion-routed posts. A post travels through several layered-encrypted hops before landing in a public space. Each hop only sees the next hop, so no single node knows both sender and destination. Proof-of-work prevents spam, and a daily rotating network key means past drops can't be correlated with current ones. Designed for sources, whistleblowers, or any conversation that shouldn't have an attributable author.

A feature that automatically sends pre-arranged messages to specific people if you don't check in before a timer expires. Set the timer from 1 hour to 30 days, pick recipients, write the messages. Check in and the clock resets; miss a check-in and the messages are sent. Useful for travel, journalists protecting sources, or any "if I don't respond by X, tell these people Y" scenario. The switch runs on peer-to-peer infrastructure, with no central authority to compel or disable.

Yes. Live streams distribute mesh-pull style: each viewer pulls chunks from a few peers and redistributes to others, BitTorrent-style but for live video. The more people watching, the stronger the distribution. No central streaming server, no middleman who could cut the stream.

Not yet. Disappearing messages are on the roadmap for an upcoming release. For now, messages you delete on your device are removed locally, but anyone you sent them to still has a copy on their device.

Emoji reactions: yes. Custom stickers: on the roadmap. Standard emoji and markdown formatting work today.

Yes. Group chats use a shared AES-256 key distributed to members via individual E2E encrypted channels. When a member leaves, a new shared key is automatically rotated so the ex-member cannot decrypt future messages. Forward secrecy keeps past ones safe.

Signal is end-to-end encrypted but runs on central servers and requires a phone number. OpenDescent is peer-to-peer (no central servers) and requires no phone number, no email, no account. OpenDescent also includes Discord-style community hubs which Signal does not. Signal has a longer independent audit track record, a larger user base, and native mobile apps. OpenDescent currently runs on Windows and Linux. See the full comparison.

Discord text messages are not end-to-end encrypted; Discord servers can read them. OpenDescent's hubs offer the same shape (channels, voice, roles, invites) but everything is end-to-end encrypted and peer-replicated. Discord also leaked 70,000 government-ID photos in October 2025 and is pushing mandatory age verification; OpenDescent never asks for your ID. See the full comparison.

WhatsApp is end-to-end encrypted via the Signal Protocol, and the cryptography itself is good. The difference is ownership: WhatsApp is owned by Meta (the same company ending Instagram encryption on May 8, 2026) and requires your phone number. OpenDescent has no owning company in a position to change the rules, and requires no phone number. See the full comparison.

Telegram's default chats are not end-to-end encrypted. Only "Secret Chats," which you must create manually, are E2E (and Secret Chats don't work in groups). Telegram's servers can read your default chats. OpenDescent is E2E by default with no toggle. So yes, on the E2E-by-default axis, OpenDescent is stronger. Telegram has larger networks and more channels/bots today.

Matrix (via Element) is federated: many servers interoperate, and you can run your own. That's a meaningful privacy improvement over a single-company service like Discord. OpenDescent goes one step further: there's no server at all. Each approach has trade-offs: federation has better moderation tooling and maturity; true P2P removes the server entirely and removes the setup friction of picking or running a homeserver.

For 1-on-1 and small-group private conversations, yes. Instagram DMs lose E2E encryption on May 8, 2026. If you move conversations where privacy actually matters (family, close friends, relationships) to OpenDescent, those conversations stay private. Instagram's broader public/social features (posts, reels, discovery) aren't in OpenDescent's scope. See Leaving Instagram DMs for the full guide.

The first time you create your identity, the app shows you a 12-word BIP39 mnemonic phrase. Write it down on paper in a safe place, or save it in a trusted password manager (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass). That phrase is the only way to recover your account on a new device. Never send it to anyone, and never paste it into any other app.

A 12-word sequence drawn from the BIP39 standard wordlist (the same system used for crypto wallets). It encodes 128 bits of entropy plus a checksum, and it deterministically derives your Ed25519 identity key. Typing the same 12 words on any OpenDescent device reconstructs the same account.

Your account cannot be recovered without it. Because there is no central server storing your identity, there is no "forgot password" option: the mnemonic is the only way to reconstruct your cryptographic identity. This is the fundamental trade-off of true E2E encryption: security properties require that nobody, including us, can recover your account without your key.

Yes, by entering your 12-word mnemonic on each device: each one reconstructs the same identity. There is currently no cross-device message sync, though: each device sees only the messages received while it was online. Cross-device sync is on the roadmap but is architecturally tricky to do right without a central coordinating server.

Yes. Usernames are not globally registered; they exist within the trust graph of your contacts. You can change your display name at any time from Settings. Your cryptographic identity (the underlying Ed25519 key) is permanent; the human-readable name on top of it is not.

You can delete your local data from within the app, which removes your identity and messages from that device. There is no central record to delete, because there is no central database, so "deleting your account" just means removing your keys from your own devices. Messages you sent to others remain on their devices; they always did.

Every device that runs OpenDescent is a peer in a libp2p mesh network. Messages travel directly from peer to peer, encrypted in transit (libp2p Noise) and encrypted end-to-end (AES-256-GCM). Peer discovery uses mDNS on local networks and KadDHT across the internet. No OpenDescent-operated machine sits between sender and recipient.

Store-and-forward: the encrypted message is held at another peer in the recipient's trust graph until they come back online. The holding peer sees ciphertext only: it can't read what it's holding, only that there's a message waiting for a specific recipient key.

Yes. OpenDescent uses DCUtR (Direct Connection Upgrade through Relay) for NAT hole-punching, attempting a direct peer connection via a temporary relay-assisted handshake. When hole-punching isn't possible, traffic falls back to Circuit Relay v2: a relay node forwards encrypted packets without having the decryption keys.

libp2p is an open-source peer-to-peer networking stack originally built for IPFS and now used by Filecoin, Ethereum, Polkadot, and many other decentralized systems. OpenDescent uses libp2p for transport (with Noise encryption and Yamux multiplexing), peer discovery (KadDHT, mDNS), and NAT traversal (DCUtR, Circuit Relay v2). It's the reason the network architecture works without servers.

Partially. On the same local network (same Wi-Fi, same LAN), two OpenDescent devices can communicate over mDNS with no internet access needed. Across the wider internet, you need connectivity to reach peers. There's no "fully offline mesh mode" today; it's an interesting future direction but not currently shipping.

No. We use standard primitives (X25519, HKDF-SHA256, AES-256-GCM, Ed25519) assembled directly rather than adopting the Signal Protocol's Double Ratchet. Per-message ephemeral X25519 key agreement gives us forward secrecy without the Double Ratchet's stateful design, which fits peer-to-peer delivery more cleanly than a strictly server-mediated chain. See the security page for details.

Yes: OpenDescent Pro, £5/month. It's optional. Every core feature (messaging, calls, hubs, encryption) is free forever. Pro unlocks larger file transfers, more hubs, and helps fund the project.

Pro unlocks:

• Larger file transfers (500MB per file vs 35MB on free)
• Unlimited groups and hubs (free tier caps both)
• Dead Man's Switch: auto-send messages on missed check-in
• Cosmetic perks: avatar frames, vibe themes, username color
• Priority support on GitHub Discussions

None of these affect encryption, privacy, or the core messaging experience. We don't sell verified badges or status credentials.

A one-time £1 purchase for lifetime Pro, limited to the first few users. Every Pro feature, forever. We launched it to reward people who supported the project early. See the homepage for current availability.

£5 per month. No annual or longer-term discounts yet (we'll add them once we know what sensible ones look like). Founder's Edition is a one-time £1 purchase for lifetime Pro, while spots remain.

Entirely through Pro subscriptions and Founder's Edition purchases. No ads. No data sales. No "enterprise tier" that compromises on privacy for business customers. We can't run an advertising business because there is no central server to aggregate data from, and that's a feature, not a bug. The subscription model keeps incentives aligned with users, not advertisers.

No. Stripe never sees your peer ID. When you click "Unlock Pro," the checkout session is created without any peer-ID metadata. Stripe sees a payment from your card; it does not see a link to your OpenDescent identity.

After checkout, you receive a redemption code on the success page. You paste that code into the app, where your peer ID lives locally. The code-to-peer-ID binding happens on our license server, and Stripe is not part of that handshake.

For maximum privacy, toggle Anonymous renewal at redemption time. The license server will then forget your peer ID after activation, and you'll receive a fresh redemption code by email each renewal cycle. Trade-off: small UX friction, no persistent peer-ID record on our side.

A non-KYC payment rail (Bitcoin Lightning) is on the roadmap to remove even the Stripe layer for users who want it.

A 16-character code (formatted as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX) that proves you paid, without identifying you to Stripe. Open the app, go to Settings → Redeem Code, paste the code, and click Activate. The code is deleted on redemption: single-use, single-binding to your peer ID. If you lose the code before redeeming, contact support with your Stripe receipt and we can re-issue it.

Buying Pro or Founder's Edition is the most direct way to support the project financially. Code contributions are welcome on GitHub, and we review all PRs. Spreading the word (Reddit, GitHub stars, sharing comparison pages) materially helps too.

Usually one of these: (1) your firewall is blocking the libp2p ports, so try enabling the app through Windows Firewall when prompted; (2) your NAT is particularly aggressive and DCUtR hole-punching isn't working, in which case circuit relay should kick in automatically; (3) the peer you're trying to reach is offline and store-and-forward hasn't resolved yet, so messages will deliver when they return. If problems persist, open a GitHub Discussion with your logs.

WebRTC calls need: (1) microphone permission in Windows; (2) UDP traffic to STUN/TURN servers; (3) at least one peer that can route the call. If you're on a corporate or school network, UDP is often blocked. On a normal home network, allow OpenDescent through Windows Defender Firewall and it should work. Check that your microphone is selected correctly in Settings.

Open an issue on GitHub Issues with: steps to reproduce, expected behaviour, actual behaviour, your OS version, the app version (shown in Settings → About), and any relevant log output. Most bugs get a response within a day or two.

The installer is code-signed (by "Open Source Developer Alan Ivanovas", via Certum), but with a standard certificate rather than an Extended Validation one, so SmartScreen still warns until the certificate builds reputation across enough installs. Click "More info" → "Run anyway" to proceed. You can confirm the signature (right-click the .exe → Properties → Digital Signatures) and verify the SHA-256 against the hash on the GitHub Releases page.

Please use GitHub Security Advisories for responsible disclosure. We aim to respond within 48 hours on weekdays, coordinate on a disclosure timeline, and credit reporters unless they prefer otherwise. Do not open a public issue for security problems; use the Security tab.

If you no longer have both (a) your mnemonic and (b) a device that still has your identity, then yes, the account is gone. This is the trade-off of real end-to-end encryption: the thing that prevents us from reading your messages also prevents us from restoring your account. You can create a new identity and tell your contacts to re-add you. Future releases may include optional social-recovery options (distribute encrypted shards of your key to trusted contacts), but v0.5.7 doesn't have that yet.